Announcing Two Out Rally, Baseball MMORPG

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What is Two Out Rally?
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Two Out Rally is a massively-multiplayer online baseball role playing game. More explicitly, it's an online baseball game where tons of fans just like you can create players, manage teams, and rise to the top of the leagues by crushing the competition.

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Tell me more.
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Create: Each member of Two Out Rally starts as a scout, and in that role can create players. Choose position, left or right handedness, background, style of play, and attributes depending on exactly what type of player you want. Unlike other MMOs, there are no useless stats! All decisions matter and they all affect the game in different ways.

Coach: Another aspect of Two Out Rally is the ability to train your players and improve their various attributes. As they level up, your training regimen can produce awesome results on the field! Coach your players up and see the results.

Conquer: As scouts gain influence, they can eventually use that to be the GM or Owner of a team. In that role, you take over all aspects of team operation, like finding/acquiring talent, managing contracts, daily lineups, defensive alignments, etc. Manage a successful team and conquer the competition!

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What do I do now?
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Two Out Rally is nearing an Alpha release in April 2010--and we're looking for Alpha testers. We're looking for all sorts of players: those that have done previous testing, those that haven't, those that love baseball, and even some that don't.

If you're interested in Alpha Testing (and getting a jump on the competition as well as some admin-approved bonuses), sign up by posting over at our Facebook fan page. Just throw up a "I'd like to alpha test!" on the wall and we'll make sure and contact you when it opens.

I simply cannot wait to tell you more, but I can't give everything away up front--some of these game functions should really impress you, but some things will remain secret for as long as possible.


Until then, check out:
twooutrally.com <-- watch for updates.
Two Out Rally Facebook Fan page<-- become a fan, check out screen shots, and learn more about the game
Two Out Rally Twitter Page <-- watch for clues about the history of Two Out Rally's awesome world.
contact@twooutrally.com < -- Want to be a tester but afraid of social media? Email us!

Billy Butler: Hall of Famer

There, I said it. Previously I indicated (when comparing Billy Butler to Dave Winfield of all people) that Billy would one day hit 30 HR in a season. Sort of a lukewarm prediction for a first baseman in the modern era, don’t you think? Sure, it’s six away from the franchise’s all time leader, that legendary slugger Steve Balboni, but saying the Royals are a bit historically lacking in that particular department is like saying that the Burj Al Arab in Dubai is a hotel. So here's going out on a limb a little bit.

The basic premise of the initial argument was why Dave Winfield was an excellent Billy Butler comp by age. But who cares? That dude who hit a sausage with a bat was a top 20 comparable last year. Prince Fielder’s his number two (who certainly at least has a more similar body type to Butler than Winfield) and there was no discussion his age 23 season whether he would ever one day hit 30 bombs – he hit 50 that year.

But something changed this season, and went off the projection in a big way … and it was extra base power, just not in the way that most would notice. The man was projected to hit around 30 doubles. As of this writing, he’s now on pace for the mid 50s. Everything else (the AVG, OBP, and SLG are almost exactly as projected) is just pretty much who we thought he would be, while hoping for more.

So what does hitting that amount of doubles mean to a player of Butler’s age (23) or younger? Microsoft Excel, some google fu, and a plain ole’ desktop calculator helped me put it into context.

If Billy Butler can accomplish this very reasonable feat, does he continue to compare with a Hall of Famer?

(click to enlarge)*

No. He compares to dozens of them.

And he shares the top ten list with four.

One of them isn’t just a Hall of Famer, but one of the greatest of all time. Another was arguably the best overall player of two different decades. One was the greatest offensive player in the most difficult run scoring environment since the deadball era. And even those who didn’t make it – one was because of injuries that derailed a sure thing. And the worst among that top 10 company had 1800 career base hits and 4 all star appearances.

Just off the top 10 list are guys like A-Rod and Albert Pujols and Ted Williams. If you expand it to age 25 and younger, George Brett in 1978 is right there. So is Hank Aaron in the late 50s. In fact, the whole qualifying list basically reads like an almanac of baseball history. These are most of the greatest players in the game starting just before World War 2. And Billy would rank tied for 5th. Unless he completely falls off a cliff, he’s going to land in the top 30 or so. That’s not good company, it's legendary.

Look for yourself -->

So to address the intial premise (the Seagull conundrum if you will), did any of these guys go on to hit 30 HR in a single season? To make this completely fair, I’d have to do park and year adjustments, but frankly there’s no need. Vada Pinson never made it, but he hit in the 20s regularly, and his prime was in the long ball killing 1960s. Every single other player in the top 10 did.

This should be a world of good news for Royals fans. But there’s an aspect of it all that makes me very sad … Butler is clearly the wrong player for the wrong time. He’s built almost perfectly in the mold of the 1970s and 1980s line drive, high Batting average sluggers. The Tony Gwynns. The Robin Younts. Even the George Bretts. This is the ultimate testament to a franchise stuck completely in the past, in that their best player, their pride and joy, could be a three time MVP … if he played in Fulton County Stadium or the Houston Astrodome, wearing ugly horizontal stripes and an unflattering adjustable waistband. Their other potentially developing offensive star is more of the modern mold – walks, strikeouts, and homers … and Alex Gordon just got sent back to Triple A.

A commenter on the Winfield / Butler comparison asked if I believed that the comp could indicate that Billy would have a long career, much like Winfield did. I indicated that I didn’t believe it was possible, that Billy’s athleticism and build would eventually hold him back. I no longer fully believe that.

This study has convinced me that Billy, unlike the discipline and power mold (the old player skills) has an ability set that passes the test of time. Even the worst comps mostly had very long careers. The power may come and then go again, like so many players, but while muscles fade in the 30s (those of us there can testify to this), the eyesight lasts until 45 or so. And that gives a player like Billy an awful lot of time to compile 3,000 hits. And there’s still going to be enough aging sentimental sportswriters around that believe in the magic number, and they’re going to give Billy the nod.

Viva la Billy Butler. Hall of Fame class of 2032.


* Projected total for 2009 for players under 25

Introducing: Adjusted Doubles

Behold a limited utility addition to the baseball statistical lexicon: the Adjusted Double, hereafter referred to at least on G&C as a2b.

So what is a2b? How is it calculated? More importantly, why is it calculated? One question answered at a time.

Specifically, a2b is the number of doubles hit for a player if he were playing in the American League in a neutral park in 1980. A2b is similar to EQA or OPS+ in that it is adjusted to account for the context of the year and the ballparks of that time.

Important differences in the calculation, however, are that it accounts for doubles alone, and no other offensive factors. This leads to some different park factors (best all time doubles park: Fenway park for righties), and year adjustments, which are available from the always estimable www.baseball-reference.com. Because of the vast differences of modern parks (you know, like the customary outfield wall), I only used years from 1940 onward.

And as for the why: you’ll find out tonight.

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NL CENTRAL: Ultimate Zone Rating Comparison

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Getting Your Money's Worth: New York Yankees

There's been a lot of web noise recently regarding some enthusiastic support for Mark Teixeira as a front runner for the American League's Most Valuable Player award. It's important to note that VOC is by no means a good indicator as to likely or deserving candidates for this award: pure worth is the only indication. If a player worth 40 million dollars gets paid 40 million, he's the MVP (or at least a strong candidate), at a VOC of 0. I think that's an important disclaimer for all teams, but particularly for this money-gusher of a franchise.

So do the Yankees get their due? I don't mind saying I was surprised. Chart get!

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Of the teams where I was anticipating writing a paragraph or two describing a VOC of 0 as still being a winning franchise if the team spends enough, the Yanks outdo me. I'd still believe they're probably in the bottom half of getting their money's worth, but hey, it's a lot of money, and while studying the reasons they are in the black, I learned something interesting: in many ways they are financially more prudent than many teams spending much, much less. Let's start with this guy:

SP Chien-Ming Wang
2009 Salary: 5.0 million
2009 Performance: .55 million
2009 Anticipated Performance: .55 million (season ending surgery)
2009 VOC: -4.55 million

Before drawing up the numbers, this is one of four team numbers I was anxious to see (not coincidentally, these are the players I discuss!). I was really quite surprised that despite his really legendary failures this year, Wang ended up being almost exactly at replacement level. How on Earth did this happen? This is how.

The Yankees end up often not spending as foolishly as other teams because the money is almost meaningless to them. Taken out of the equation, they can evaluate on a case by case basis and are never afraid to pull the plug on a player who isn't living up to their expectation, regardless of salary. Of course they don't want to sign a 25 man roster of Carl Pavanos, but a 5 million sunk cost doesn't phase them in the least. They simply move to a replacement level option or to the free agent wire or to a trade. But in all manners of speech, they move on.

Cheaper teams (see Royals, Kansas City) will give high paid albatrosses every possible chance to succeed and then some(see Guillen, Jose), and will have that player dig such a hole that it's almost impossible to get out of. If Guillen hadn't left the clubhouse this year, he'd value at -12.0 million. If Chien-Ming Wang played for the Royals, he'd Jose Lima his way to a -15, hurting himself more in the process, before they pulled the plug. But the Yankees gave him some work in the pen (where he put up a bit of good value, actually) and then shut him down. It reveals teams like the Royals as the very definition of penny-wise and pound-foolish.

SS Derek Jeter
2009 Salary: 20.0 million
2009 Value to Date: 22.70 million
2009 Projected Value: 31.43 million
2009 VOC: 11.43 million

Statistically-inclined analysts get a lot of flack for their abuse of the quintessential Yankee regarding his defense, so when the chance comes to acquiesce, we should probably take it. G&C predominately uses UZR as it's defensive measurement, but Dewan plus/minus agrees on this point as well: Derek Jeter has steadily improved at defense the last two years and is now playing the best of his career.

Whether this is an indication that the average shortstop has just fallen off a cliff or Jeter has actually made these adjustments himself is completely immaterial. We will compare a man to his peers, and Jeter is looking really good right now. The man clearly loves the new Yankee stadium and is the single most valuable member of this team, and a legitimate MVP candidate. For a legend nearing the end of his career, this is the time to honor him: when he actually deserves it the most.

3B Alex Rodriguez
2009 Salary: 32.0 million
2009 Value to Date: 12.10 million
2009 Projected Value: 16.10 million
2009 VOC: -15.25 million

It's hard to call this contract a turkey, despite it's ludicrously high, almost ridiculous numbers, for the reasons mentioned above. He obviously can't live up to this number this year because of the high margin of time missed due to injury, so there's no fair game in lambasting the fellow. He's actually been the 5th most productive member of this team, which accounting for the missed time, is truly remarkable.

If Pujols has this contract, he's of mid-level value, and he's been healthy and just butchering the ball. But that's the problem with the contract itself: He absolutely has to be that good, for that long, to make himself worth it in the truest sense, and this gives an idea of just how hard that is to do at the very top level of income.

And lastly, the man of the discussion of the hour ....

1B Mark Teixeira
2009 Salary: 20 million
2009 Value to Date: 17.20 million
2009 Projected Value: 23.82 million

Again, the Yankees just want the big production, and don't care where it comes from or how efficient it is. Teixeira is in all likelihood not going to get any better than this. He's been remarkably consistent for most of his career, and is just a better paid, more visible example of himself. This is cliche by now, but it's cliche because it's true: Mark Teixeira is a very good player. Mark Teixeira is not even the MVP of his own team, let alone the American League.

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On these big contracts, if they are going to zero out by the time the curtain closes, you are mostly counting on big production in the early years, closest to the player's prime to carry the weight of the backend years. Mark Teixeira is in the first year of a monstrous, long deal. Mark Teixeira is also 29. There's reason to believe he'll age a lot better than Giambi did in pinstripes (even though Jason actually nearly validated his contract) because of his better athleticism and defense, and accounting for inflation it wasn't as expensive of a deal, but Yankees fans should just get accustomed to the fact that a lot of this will be sunk cost in about 6 years. You just have to hope that general inflation keeps up with his decline.

Concerning Randy Wolf's Day

As I browse around my favorite numbers-laden corners of the web, it seems that no one is as fascinated with last night's Dodgers-Diamondbacks game as I am. Are my eyes deceiving me? Or was Wolf's performance last night on the very cusp of all time greatness?

Randy Wolf (Aug. 17 vs. Diamondbacks)
On the mound: 7.2 IP, 5 H, 3 ER, 0 BB, 10 K, 1 HR

At the plate: 3/4, 2B, HR, 3 RBI

... and it's probably better than it looks. If not for what seemed like sheer physical exhaustion (he'd had a long day), Wolf looked unhittable before the 8th: 4 of those hits including the HR coming in that final 2/3 of an inning. So assuming Joe Torre removes Wolf after the 7th, here's the pitching line:

7 IP, 1 H, 0 ER, 0 BB, 10 K.

Between the 1st inning with one out and the end of the 7th, no batters reached against him. 20 retired in a row. 74% of a perfect game was thrown in the same period that the pitcher fell a triple shy of hitting for the cycle. Simply amazing.

Small caveat here: Wolf's double came in the top of the 8th inning, so Torre would have had to leave him in to bat in this situation to complete the offensive leg of this feat. In retrospect, it's probably running out that very double that finished off that last bit of gas.

So if Randy Wolf could have finished off 7 additional hitters without allowing a hit (a feat accomplished in 49% of games played this year) and hit a triple, would this have been considered the single best performance by a player well ... ever?

If a PA can reasonably be considered 20% of a hitter's offensive day, an equivalent number of batters faced for a pitcher would be around 5-6. So for a hitter facing an equally improbably milestone, he was the equivalent of just one appearance away as both a hitter and a pitcher from completing a feat unlikely to ever be matched again.

I'm still in a pattern of trying to capture the scope of just what we're talking about here. Has a pitcher hit for the cycle before? He has - although Jimmy Ryan was primarily a centerfielder for the Cubs ... in 1888.

Perfect games? We know what those look like, thanks to Mark Beurhle earlier this year ... only the 16th one of those in Major League history. So how on Earth could you quantify those two feats? It is the very peak of not one but two types of performance.

Vince Young in the 2006 Rose Bowl? 467 total yards of offense. Best ever in a BCS championship game. But even just accomplishing those feats with his arm would pale in comparison. He'd have to compile two historic days into one. Something like 500 yards passing and 200 yards rushing. That's possible ... if he stays at home instead and plays the game on the XBox. With twenty minute quarters. And playing against a roommate using the broken controller.

Muhammad Ali vs. Cleveland Williams in Houston, 1966? A third round knockout where your opponent lands approximately one punch? Maybe if Williams' trainer was allowed to fight alongside him simultaneously.

Wilt Chamberlain's 100 points? Only if it comes with 20 blocked shots and rebounds, and 8 women after the game. Okay, that last part probably happened.

Ferris Beuhler? Maybe if he was used as a relief pitcher for the Cubs that day.

All in all, it's actually a tragic story. At the end, it's a really good game, one the annals of baseball are chock full of. Randy Wolf just got the five lottery numbers without hitting the Powerball, and got the 200,000 dollars. And his family can all celebrate, and he'll be a human interest story on a drab local news broadcast, and he can buy that new car he's always wanted and have a nice party.

But if you're in his shoes, how do you not spend the rest of your life wondering what happens if that last little red ball had blown into place, exchanging that nice new sedan in for a nice new oh, private island? This is probably the legacy of Randy Wolf that I will remember. And unfortunately, no one else.

Getting Your Money's Worth: St. Louis Cardinals

This is a difficult post to write, just because the team has Albert Pujols on it.

Writing objective analysis about Pujols is like critiquing literature when discussing Thomas Pynchon or music when debating Bob Dylan. There are just so many superlatives after all, and they've all been used up. No one reading this doesn't know that Albert Pujols is a fantastic player. They've seen countless studies showing that he far surpasses his peers, year-by-year breakdowns with how he compares to the best first basemen of all time, offensively and defensively. Versus other right handed hitters. Versus the greatest at any position. The universal glow is going to make it difficult to sleep soon. The world doesn't need another one of those articles to be convinced. I'll just let his position on JB's chart speak for itself, and address a couple of other players.

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Best 2009 contract (non-Pujols division): SP Adam Wainright

2009 salary: 2.8 million
2009 Projected Value: 23.31 million
2009 VOC: 20.51 million

This number is actually even better today, as I drew them up before his performance last night against the Padres. Wainwright has now gone 23 straight starts of 6 innings or more. He also will probably pass his career high in IP and pitch counts, and doesn't have that long of a track record as a starter, so the normal injury red flags for the next 2 years still apply. Still, the 4 year deal has looked like a real winner and even if he sat out the next 2 full seasons, he's earned his keep already.

Biggest 2009 Contract Turkey (most certainly a non-Pujols division):

SS Khalil Greene

2009 Salary: 6.5 million
2009 Projected Value: -2.9 million
2009 VOC: -9.48

I appreciate the concept of buying low. Greene came off a 2008 with the Padres with severely diminished offensive and defensive value, and despite being two years off his theoretical peak, looked to rebound with the bat somewhat by avoiding playing in godawful offensive environment Petco Park. Even the 6.5 million dollar pricetag seemed reasonable for a player who most of his career was around a league average shortstop.

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Now the only bright light on his season is the Jeremy Giambi effect. The continued downward trend of his offense (.206/.281/.362) is salvagable and probably due for positive regression due to a healty walk rate, a robust ISO, and a grotesquely unlucky BABIP of .269. But the defensive range is completely gone (UZR/150 of -25.4, 60% worse than last year, his previous career low), and if a position change is pending, he's never made enough contact to justify hanging around on a Major League field. I think he probably has one year left to turn it around, before this surfer dude's tide goes permanently out.*

I promised myself I wouldn't do this, but he's still more valuable than Yuniesky Betancourt, and no one would have dreamed of giving up a good pitching prospect for him.

Billy Butler: One of These Things Is Like the Other...

… at least according to the Baseball Prospectus Player Comparison Model. This model compares a player’s age, size, handedness, position and tendencies in the core batting elements that BP tracks, which are BA (Batting Average), ISO (Isolated Slugging), BB (Walk Rate), K (Strikeout Rate), and SPD (general foot speed and baserunning acumen).

So for those of you without a paid account or unwilling to risk minor copyright infringement, who would you guess to be Butler’s most comparable player at this age throughout history? Two years ago Albert Pujols was his number 3, that tenuous connection long dashed by a higher BMI and quite a bit less “oomph” in the bat.*

*In Albert Pujols’ age 23 season, he hit .359/.439/.667, won a batting title, and finished 2nd in the MVP voting. While we discuss optimistically how Billy will turn some of his doubles into HR, Pujols hit 43 HR … and still led the league with 51 doubles. Unreal.

So we have to settle for a new comp. How bad is this going to get? A number of Kansas City fans are seeing another Mike Sweeney, a big, pudgy faced right-hander incapable of handling the field and heading for a number of sore back days on the DL. This is not a fan base accustomed to being optimistic.

Maybe Ken Harvey? Heavy, slow, limited defensively, had some nice moments. Baseball Reference certainly seems to think so, based on career to date statistics, a pretty useless measurement for a just turned 23 year old.

So how about a Hall of Famer instead of a future one? A player who put up 3000 plus hits, over 1000 of them for extra bases? Who made 12 All Star games and won 7 Gold Gloves (okay, PECOTA doesn’t pretend to be a defensive forecaster)? A player who was still an effective hitter into his 40s? It would be hard to turn down such a resume, and you shouldn’t. So unless you have a BP account, you probably wouldn’t have guessed this player, because it’s physically an impossibility for anyone to be called his comparable in physical prowess and look any less like Billy Butler.

I give you Dave Winfield, college basketball star, terrific all around athlete, first ballot Hall of Fame class of 2001.

So let’s break this puzzlement down a bit.

22 year old Dave Winfield: .265/.318/.438, 20 HR, 18 2B, OPS+ 115

22 year old Billy Butler: .275/.324/.400, 11 HR, 22 2B, OPS+ 94

Hello increased run scoring environment of 2008 vs. 1974, just a few years removed from the 2nd deadball era. But wait, there’s more. Winfield played in 30 more games. And San Diego Stadium, where Winfield played at home (later known as Qualcomm) was a much better HR environment than Petco is now, which may explain the exchange of 2B for HR. All in all, pretty spot on. Almost identical walk rates (.053 vs. .049), Batting Averages, the lot. Interestingly, Butler was a more valuable base stealer, via the Wargames alternative – for him, the way to win was not to play. One attempted steal all year (he was caught), while Winfield attempted 16 times and got caught 7, wiping out his 9 successes and more of his value from OBP in the process. So how is this projection holding up? And how does Billy’s immediate future look when compared to the man Goerge Steinbrenner famously dubbed Mr. May?

Dave Winfield (ages 23-29)

23 1975 .267 .354 .403, 15 HR, 20 2B, 116 OPS+
24 1976 .283 .366 .431, 13 HR, 26 2B, 135 OPS+
25 1977 .275 .335 .467, 25 HR, 29 2B, 123 OPS+
26 1978 .308 .367 .499, 24 HR, 30 2B, 151 OPS+
27 1979 .308 .395 .558, 34 HR, 27 2B, 166 OPS+ (league leader)
28 1980 .276 .365 .450, 20 HR, 25 2B, 133 OPS+
29 1981 .294 .360 .464, 13 HR, 25 2B, 139 OPS+ (injury shortened season)

Pretty encouraging. At his typical player peak, he hit 34 HR, which was no joke in the ballparks and environment of the late 1970s. We can easily see that the extra base hit total did continue to increase, which should give the Royals hope for the best pure hitter their system has produced in at least a decade.

This is technically considered Billy’s age 23 season, so let’s see how he measures up so far.

23 2009 .300 .355 .481, 13 HR, 36 2B, 120 OPS+

Accounting for differences in era, this comp definitely gets the thumbs up for it’s first year of projection: that is almost exactly the player. But how about a look into the immediate future? Is Billy Butler going to finish 3rd in the MVP discussion at 26, like his lanky counterpart? Hey, this comp promises us there are about 2800 base hits to go. But since we can reasonably assume that if Billy Butler turns into a future Hall of Fame player, greener pastures are in his future. Let’s assume the Royals can sign a long term deal and take 2 years of FA away, taking him through 29, just past the apex of his theoretical peak to the vast (in Winfield’s case, practically endless) decline beyond.

A fair disclaimer for these long term projections: like the 7 day weather forecast or visiting the fortune teller, it’s a fun exercise, but don’t change your plans. These projections were made before the season, and included this year, so it could be fun to include them, see how close they are, maybe validate the process a bit.

2009 (age 23) .291 .352 .458 , 15 HR, 29 2B
2010 (age 24) .289 .355 .454 , 16 HR, 32 2B
2011 (age 25) .294 .358 .465 , 17 HR, 31 2B
2012 (age 26) .293 .362 .468 , 18 HR, 31 2B
2013 (age 27) .293 .364 .457 , 16 HR, 29 2B
2014 (age 28) .298 .365 .403 , 18 HR, 29 2B
2016 (age 29) .302 .371 .491 , 18 HR, 28 2B

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First of all, note how close the first two parts of the triple slash stats are. The difference is slugging, and it’s almost entirely related to two baggers. The Home Run projection looks solid.But the doubles projection was based on a player who showed decline in extra base hit power over the first two years of his career in a pretty large sample size of AB, giving the system some reason to believe that his power had, if not peaked, certainly showed it’s limitations. But Butler has a good 40 games to go, and has already surpassed that projection by 24%. Considering how close PECOTA is on the rest of his skillset, what does this do to his projection?

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Good things. Lots of them. Better hitters get more walks. A skyrocketing line drive percentage (the most important aspect of hitting a double) drives up batting averages. A common adage says that a player under 25 who hits 40 or more doubles will have almost exactly 50% of those past a certain number (usually around 15, which accounts for bloopers down the line and lucky breaks in the OF) will turn into HR. Reference Dave Winfield’s line as he ages to see this happen.

So fine, here's some good news. Short version of the story: Pending his health, Billy Butler will hit 30 HR in the major leagues someday very soon. And he may be six-foot-six. And seagulls should be terrified of him.

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WAR vs. Wins - An American League Study

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Getting Your Money's Worth: The Resulting Laughter

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Notes:
Projected Value Over Contract = (Projected Value - Contract)
Projected Value = 2009 Performance to date extrapolated through the end of the season.

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Notes:
44.7% of all payroll tied up in Jose Guillen, Gill Meche, Coco Crisp, and Kyle Farnsworth.


For reference, please refer to the brilliant research and analysis by JWF:

Getting Your Money's Worth Part I: The Setup
Getting Your Money's Worth Part II: The Punchline

Getting Your Money's Worth: The Punchline

Now things start to shape up, and like a strip club in the daylight, it's way uglier than it seemed before. This is still made using best available payroll information and Wins Above Replacement Level.

The "A" Team (Players Acquired by the Royals under former GM / Team President Allard Baird)

Total Salary: 15.19 million (counting only players currently on the 25 man roster)

Total 2009 Value to Date: 44.3
Total 2009 Projected Value: 51.2
Total Return: 36.01

The "D" Students (Players Acquired by Dayton Moore):

Total Salary: 68.15
Total 2009 Value To Date: 33.2
Total 2009 Projected Value: 38.8
Total Return: -44.8

In non-Betancourt related material, this is the most damning piece of evidence I've seen. And it's worth noting that the prized shortstop in question isn't even included in this, due to negligible pay to date and an uncertain salary arrangement from the Mariners. But it does include a great year from Bannister. And Gil Meche's work. And Joakim Soria. There's just no hiding what a catastrophic failure Dayton Moore is at acquiring talent for the major league level.

This team has the 15th highest payroll in the league, and by value in investment should have the 25th best record. (Which is pretty darn close, actually. As per my Pythagorean post, they are slightly underperforming.)

If you take away Zack Grienke's contribution , this team is not just the worst in the league, but one of the worst of all time.

Getting Your Money's Worth

I want each and every one of you to reference this chart the next time someone complains that the Royals' difficulties arise from a low payroll.

This is a breakdown of the top 10 Royals earners (plus #10's doppleganger), comparing their annual salary to the value of their contributions in pitching, hitting, baserunning, and fielding. I've used Fangraph's numbers for Wins Above Replacement and a portion of Baseball Prospectus' WARP and playing time projection charts. Salary numbers are represented in millions.

1. RF Jose Guillen
Salary: 12.0
2009 Value to Date: (-7.8)
2009 End of Season Projected Value: (-12.6)
Total Return: (-24.6)

You're reading that properly. The only way Jose Guillen breaks even is if another team pays you 12.6 million dollars to play him. It's not a 12 million dollar per year mistake at this point, it's a 25 million a year one.

2. SP Gil Meche
Salary: 11.0
2009 Value to Date: 8.2
2009 Projected Value: 13.3
Total Return: 2.3

Not bad, but this projection assumes that this year isn't over for him because of the flagrant abuse he endured. If it is, you're 2.8 million in the hole, which doesn't look that bad as long as you compare it to Jose Guillen.

3. CF Coco Crisp
Salary: 6.1
2009 Value to Date: 5.6
2009 Projected Value: 5.6
Total Return: (-.5)

Coco's defense was exactly as advertised, but this number doesn't look nearly as good when you consider that the buyout on his option is now a complete certainty and a total sunk cost. In another one of the many sad ways the Royals can be summed up, Crisp is their 2nd most valuable position player despite not having played since early June.

4. RP Kyle Farnsworth
Salary: 4.3
2009 Value To Date: 1.8
2009 Projected Value: 2.1
Total Return: (-2.2)

The 2009 value numbers are based on what turned out to be a very down free agent market. Kyle Farnsworth is the winner of this year's golden goose award, and his contract was already twice too high before the season even got underway. This was like buying a house in Las Vegas in 2007, but the checks still have to cash. Honestly, he's better than I would have anticipated.

5. RP Ron Mahay
Salary: 4.0
2009 Value to Date: (-.5)
2009 Projected Value: (-.8)
Total Return: (-4.8)

6. SP Zack Grienke
Salary: 3.8
2009 Value to Date: 28.8
2009 Projected Value: 38.2
Total Return: 34.4

I could be a killjoy and point out that as absolutely unprecedented as that return is, it will go nothing but down as the backloaded part of the contract approaches and the performance regresses, but I've decided not to be that guy. I'll be this guy instead: What does this team look like without him?

7. LF David DeJesus
Salary: 3.6
2009 Value to Date: 8.0
2009 Projected Value: 9.1
Total Return: 5.5

It's extremely laudable that DeJesus has put up such a high value while posting an OPS+ of 94, particularly at a corner outfield slot. What's making this arrangement work is the best left field defense in the majors, and among the best glove work regardless of position. The Royal regime's long term insistence that David was incapable of playing center field despite evidence for the contrary has clearly been shown as fallacy. At least this year, however, it's hard to cast blame: Coco Crisp is probably the best defensive center fielder in baseball. More on this and how it applies to Zack Grienke later.

8. UTIL Mark Teahen
Salary: 3.6
2009 Value to Date: 5.1
2009 Projected Value: 6.0
Total Return: 2.4

The most valuable player in the majors that nobody seems to want that much, Mark has been quietly solid and has no reason to be ashamed to cash his check. Baserunning still is what moves him from marginal to useful.

9. DH, "1B" Mike Jacobs
Salary: 3.3
2009 Value to Date: (-1.9)
2009 Projected Value: (-3.0)
Total Return: (-6.3)

For comparison, Russ Branyan of the M's:

Salary: 1.4
2009 Value to Date: 11.0
Projected Value: 12.2
Total Return: 13.6

And of course, without the cost of a useful reliever.

Even more telling, Kila Ka'aihue would have had to put up worse offensive numbers than Tony Pena Jr. did in 2008 in order to be less valuable than Jacobs.

10. C John Buck
Salary: 2.9
2009 Value to Date: 2.1
2009 Projected Value: 2.9
Total Return: 0.0

Value for catcher has to be taken with a grain of salt, thanks to woefully imperfect defensive statistics at the position, but Buck is who he's always been: a perfectly average player at his position who seems like he's failing. Plus, this team likes to pay him pretty decent money to backup, even though he offers no complimentary skillset compared to his overstudy. Which brings us to ...

11. C Miguel Olivo
Salary: 2.7
2009 Value to Date: 5.0
2009 Projected Value: 5.5
Total Return: 2.8

Miguel Olivo has some fatal flaws in his offensive game, and they are a perfect reflection of the flaws in the Royals valuations. As such, it's easy to villify but a catcher who hits home runs alone makes him valuable, even if every other skill is completely substandard. Replacement at the position is just that difficult.

Read the follow up HERE.
For pretty charts on the subject, please see THIS.

AL CENTRAL: Ultimate Zone Rating Comparison

League Average: .003

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The Yuni-Cycle

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Actions Speak Louder than Words -- and Results Speak for Themselves

I really hate clichés. I mean I REALLY hate them. They're so often a crutch of those with nothing to say, and worse, they so often conflict with common sense.* "Actions speak louder than words," but "the pen is mightier than the sword." These are the empty words of people attempting to justify their actions.

*The big one around the office right now is, "it is what it is," usually in reference to some unfortunate corporate red tape that can't be overcome. "It is what it is." What the hell does this even mean? Is it really what it is or are you just accepting what it isn't because what is can't be what it's not or...wait. *whew* Let's move on.

So when I hear Dayton Moore tell Royals fans to "trust the process," I think responding with a cliché, like "it is what it is," might be using a crutch when the truth is needed. I'd rather follow up with a more serious response. Questions like, "what actually is the process?" spring immediately to mind.

The problem is that the process is becoming obvious. Dayton Moore likes speed, unless the player is good at stealing bases. He likes guys that have great range, unless they're good at defense. He likes good, hard working, honest guys, unless he has to settle for the me-first 'roiders and drunk drivers. Dayton is focusing on tomorrow and building up the farm leagues, but everything points to him attempting a run in 2010.* And he LOVES some guys that have great On Base Percentage, unless they can draw a walk.

*Walter has something on this coming down the pipe so I'll let him speak to that.

It's the numerous self-evident conflicts that give me pause, and there's only three logical conclusions that I can come up with:

• Crazy: He's attempting to rebuild the 1985 World Series Team, Hall-of-Famer be damned. He's ignoring OBP because the '85 team did too. He sees "fast outfielders" and "big outfield" and one Commissioner's Trophy and has assumed that's the only way to do it in KC.
• Scary: He's lying. He actually hates the stat-heads because he trusts his eyes. His time spent as a scout was in the grand tradition of trusting your gut, looking for intangibles, and obviously finding guys with lots of grit (of which only scouts that ride minor league busses learn the recipe to).
• Sad: He actually doesn't have a plan. He doesn't have a strategy, an overarching theme, a comprehensive logical program built to rebuild this sad franchise and turn it into a perpetual contender.

Now, I don't believe any of those. The truth probably lies somewhere in the middle; he knows the Kauffman Stadium quirkiness requires two center fielders, he probably doesn't trust sabermetrician's conclusions completely, and his plan may have gone to hell when he realized he couldn't bring in the pieces he wanted at a fair price. Let's give him what little benefit of the doubt he deserves.

But let us not be fooled. On base percentage is not a priority for Dayton Moore, regardless of 'the process.' To fall back on those damnable clichés again, let's let his actions speak louder than his words.

Let the results speak for themselves.

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Tinkering with Pythagorean Expectation, Now With 80% less math

One of the original great Bill James ideas was a formula using runs scored for and runs allowed by a team to determine what their win-loss record should have been, rather than what it actually was. This notably identified factors of luck to determine whether a team left untouched likely were better or worse than they had appeared to be, as explained HERE.

(2003-2004 Royals fans may be a bit touchy about just how big of an effect this can be).

One of the biggest issues with traditional Pythag expectation was that the importance of statistical outliers could not be minimized in the greater calculation, and could be misleading regarding the team's greater success and how much random chance had to do with it (we've all seen it before: consider a pitcher with a high ERA in which it really was the result of one disastrous start rather than an actual consistent level of mediocre or poor play. That ERA is not indicative of what sort of performance you are likely to get - for reference, see the 2009 line of Ricky Nolasco)

Or, in our own context, a fictional week of games between two teams, the Warriors and the Aztecs:

Game 1: Warriors 18, Aztecs 0
Game 2: Warriors 2, Aztecs 4
Game 3: Warriors 0, Aztecs 1
Game 4: Warriors 4, Aztecs 5
Game 5: Warriors 13, Aztecs 8

Over these 5 games, the Warriors scored 37 total runs (7.4 per game) and allowed 18 (3.6 per).

Without doing a single bit of math, given those numbers, you would expect the Warriors to be a winning team (scoring 205% more than you allow is a good way to do that). The traditional formula says the Warriors should be 4-1 over this period, and yet they are 2-3, thanks to a couple of games of extremely high offense tilting the numbers.

In just a simple 5 game series, the formula is at -2. If similar games repeated themselves for a 162 game series, the formula would be 65 games off the actual pace for the team!

Mind you, this doesn't happen. Teams don't score 18 runs and then 0 in the same week very often. The teams will all regress to more "normal" performances, and the odd variation found in that 5 game set with the Aztecs would be lost forever, softened by reality. But that doesn't mean the flaw isn't there: it just got buried by reason. But these things happen: remember when the Rangers put up a 30 spot on Baltimore in 2007? That sort of fluctuation did really significant damage to Texas' runs per game (and Baltimore's allowed), even though the value of runs roughly 7-30 were minimal. Spread those runs out, and Texas can win probably 8 more games on the excess alone. That's roughly what Hanley Ramirez would give you over Yuniesky Betancourt. And it gets counted twice: those runs could have cost Baltimore to conservatively lose 8 more games ... that's a 16 game swing for the whole league: on the results of just one game, mind you, a spectacular one. But while a 30 run game is truly remarkable, 10 run games are relatively commonplace, and 3 or 4 of those can add up to the same error.

Of course, there was improvement. There are some excellent and math heavy ways in which Bill James' original Pythagorean expectation have been tweaked, notably HERE, the best available material on the subject from two of sabermetrics' most valuable minds.

But almost all of these calculations require a year in review, specifically as it relies to park value and run scoring environment - most of these variables are anything but static and make an end of season predictor very difficult. Of course, as is known and proven time and time again, nothing in baseball is on a perfectly laid path - players get hurt, players get traded, schedules are unbalanced.

But in a big enough sample size, (say, post-All Star break), it's easy to crank out a simple tool with pretty alarming accuracy (and embarrassingly low mathematical acumen) to determine roughly how a team will finish.

The first thing you need to know is the runs scored per game for the entire league: (in the case of 2009, 4.57 as of this print). Interestingly, baseball hasn't varied too much on this, considering: look at each year since 2000:

2009 (to date): 4.57
2008: 4.65
2007: 4.80
2006: 4.85
2005: 4.59
2004: 4.81
2003: 4.73
2002: 4.61
2001: 4.77
2000: 5.14 (!)

Only one of those numbers really stands out, and it's during the ... ahem ... offensive explosion of the late 90s and early 00s which I will leave for discussion elsewhere.

So barring some obsence 1968 pitching or 2000 hitting numbers, the average number of runs scored will be in somewhere in the 4s. And since I've never seen a team score exactly 4.54 runs in a game, you either score above the norm (5 or more) or fewer (4 or less). Simple, right? Well, not quite. The scale is top-heavy as it is open ended up on the right side (you can score unlimited runs, but you can't score less than zero). This doesn't have a huge effect, but it makes scoring or allowing 4 runs the grey area, as you will win half the time if you score or allow exactly 4 runs.

Now to predict a team's win-loss record going forward: we do it by a way that fans have done for a long time, only with definable values:

1. If a team scores 5 runs or more, it's an offensive success. That side of their game has given their team an adequate or better chance to win.

2. If a team allows 4 runs or fewer, it's a defensive success.

3. Count the number of total "successes" your team has for the year (you can have 2 successes in one game, or you can have 1 or zero, we are measuring different sides of the game). Keep the offensive and defensive successes separate: we'll use them again later.

4. Divide the total number of successes by 2. This is your expected number of wins to this point in the season. The variation should be small, and can be attributed to bad luck or could be a red flag for bad managing, especially if that approaches 5 or so per 100 games.

5. Divide the number of successes on both offense and defense by the number of games played to that point. This determines the rate at which your team is getting adequate performances.

6. Extrapolate that rate of success over your remaining games for both to determine your expected W-L for the end of the year.

All right, everybody still with me? Good. Because it's fun, and if they haven't done a good enough job themselves, let's rip apart the Kansas City Royals.

2009 W-L: 40-61

Offensive Successes: 39 (38.6%)
Defensive Successes: 51 (50.4%)

Expected W-L: 45-56

Uh-oh Trey.

So what we see here is nothing too terribly surprising ... The Royals are a mediocre pitching team (in a future post, I may see what happens if you replacement Grienke with an average starter) and a bad hitting team, and these numbers reflect that.

Expected W-L over 162: 67-95

That's sure not good, is it? Luckily more waiver wire gritty speedsters are on the way.

AL CENTRAL: One of These Things is Not Like the Other

One of these things just isn't the same!

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Beginning In the Middle

So this isn't exactly the beginning. This is more of a reset.*

So what's being reset? Gritty&Clutch is starting over, but only in theory. When we first started this thing last year, it was supposed to be a joke--some way we could get our rocks off by making fun of stupid things around sports while hopefully offering some intelligent stat-based commentary along the way.

"Let's just have fun and see who we can piss off." And thus it began. We had some good stuff, and some pretty bad stuff too. After a few silly articles, our original idea of Stats with Snark morphed into some Onion-y type sports satire site. Needless to say there's not a huge market for that. Nor was it very fun. How many different ways can one take some current sports headline, make fun of it, and keep it interesting?

* Am I the only one so obsessive compulsive that the [RESET] button on his NES was his best and worst enemy? How many games of Mario did I play, whereupon the first accidental death, I shot my finger to the reset button before the next life? I always knew I would need every life I could get if I ever wanted to beat it. I never did.

I had that awful habit when playing on my Grandma's piano too. I only knew the beginning of Axel Foley (really just the first six or seven notes) and would attempt to play for my sister --who I might say was never impressed with my piano playing OR my Nintendo-resetting habits-- and all the while I would get a few notes in, mess up, and start over. Over and over again. I didn't have much of an audience for very long.

Worse, I still do this. I have a game for the PC called Age of Empires III (quite fun), but it always feels like the first ten minutes are the most important. So, when things don't quite go my way after the first ten, rather than play it out and feel failure, I just hit [RESTART] and try again. I rarely finish a game that I won't win.

Is there something wrong with that? I can't be the only 80s generation kid so pleased with himself, so afraid of failure, so arrogant and anal and obsessive that I refuse to observe the Game Over screen?

Some time later we got bored, worked on different projects, and Gritty&Clutch fell by the wayside. I started a website about video game sales of all things*, and I really polished up my chart making skills.

That was a year ago.

*I don't want to get off on too far of a tangent, but I really have fully embraced my inner dork. As if the previous passage didn't tip you off, I'm quite the dork. Video games, fantasy books, Dungeons & Dragons, tabletop war games, Quantum Leap, dinosaurs, Star Trek, computers; all of them have embarrassed me at some point.

And video game sales. I found this little subset of dorkery and started making charts. Crazy charts, like "Which Nintendo game sold the most ever?" ."Will increased sales in Japan mean increased sales world wide?". "How do Konami and EA financials compare?", etc. Enough people liked them that I started a little site for my dorky hobby, and now I think I can apply this dorkeriffic habit to baseball.

Which brings me to today. Some time ago, I met this cool dude at work who mentions that he likes baseball and we were best buds instantly. Me and my love of all things dorkeriffic, Walter opened the doors to a secret society. Something about "sabermetrics" and "baseball math." It sounded hilarious.

I learned about the hidden world of baseball, and I learned that sabermetrics really isn't scary at all. It's just a statistical approach to America's Pastime. I discovered the beauty of OPS+. JoePo. Rany. FireJoeMorgan. While it was tremendously fun to learn about and have my eyes opened to all the possibilities, it wasn't hilarious at all, nor was it hidden. It was right there in front of everybody.

I slowly came to understand that the reason my favorite team, my most-loved childhood team, my sad-sack, constantly losing, pathetic Kansas City Royals baseball team didn't lose because the evil Yankees had all the money. They didn't lose because they couldn't keep their best players. They didn't lose because of Evil Boras and those big meanies in Beantown.

Bad decisions and a rejection of analysis are why the Royals continue to lose. Over and over and over again. Not money. Not Boras. Not a curse. Just bad management and bad decisions.

This is now. Here I am, with a new perspective. Gritty&Clutch will be several things and none combined. It will be a place for stat-based commentary and analysis, baseball charts, conversational exchanges between Walter and I, and sometimes a little snark.

So we're starting over, but not really. We're continuing with a renewed focus on fun and real insight. This time I'm taking my finger off the reset button.

-Justin

Darth Tiger Orders Destruction of Planet Rocco

Darth Tiger ruthlessly destroyed the peaceful planet of Rocco Monday afternoon after toying with the idea since Sunday.

The Mediatians, the nomadic and generally unsuccessful people of the now destroyed planet, fought valiantly witnesses say.

"It was amazing. Here's this giant Death Club completely aimed at Rocco," traveling merchant and part-time bard Bobus Costamus described with with both awe and fear in his eyes, "and the Mediate people really tried their best."

But that wasn't enough to stop the awesome destructive power of the Death Club, Darth Tiger's perch from which he has destroyed at least thirteen other peaceful planets.

"As always, it wasn't really fair. Darth Tiger has a giant laser beam that focuses the Nike Force into white-hot solar system destroying power, and the Mediatians had wooden clubs? This terror must be stopped."

Unconfirmed reports described a resistance force covertly organized by the Empire outlaw known as Obi-Wan Mickelson, but those rumors were quickly dispelled when his body was found in the 13th Quandrant of the Open system.

Bill Bavasi Loses Millions of Mariners' Money In Nigerian Email Scam

"I don't really know what to say. It sounded like a really great investment."

GM of the Mariners since 2004, Bill Bavasi announced Friday that he was victimized by a Nigerian Email scam and lost approximately 70 million dollars over the next 5 years.

"It was real simple. I put money [of the Mariners] into an account and the dividends were supposed to start showing up any day now."

When it was pointed out that the Nigerian Email Scam has been common knowledge for years now, Bavasi replied, "...it was never really completely explored and a team with a smaller payroll has to take some chances here and there."

Does this finally put Bavasi in jeopardy of losing his job? Mariners CEO Howard Lincoln will give him the benefit of the doubt.

"Bill is doing the job, and the team's performance is not related to his work. It's purely related to [the account] performance and underachieving."